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THE PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS ACT
NICHOLAS UNKOVIC*
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act of June 1, 1937, P. L. 1168,1 was
patterned to a large degree after the National Labor Relations Act of July 1,
1935,2 sometimes known as the "Wagner Labor Act," and to a lesser extent after
the Federal Railway Labor Act.3 One of the factors in the passage of the Pennsylvania Act, which in turn has been termed the "Little Wagner Act," was the
fact that the National Act was upheld as constitutional 4 at the time the Pennsylvania Legislature had it under discussion. 6
Due to the crystallization of certain changes in our economic and social life
involving fundamental rights inherent in capital and labor, it became necessary
to enact such labor legislation. Problems between management and employes
became so dtailed and intricate that some sort of governmental supervision
seemed appropriate.$
*A.B. Harvard University, 1928; LL.B. Dickinson School of Law, 1932; Member of Pennsylvania Bar.
'Act of June 1, 1937, P. L. 1168, 43 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 211.1. Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Act has been held to be constitutional as a valid exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth.
In Spungin's Appeal, it has been held not to unlawfully interfere with liberty of contract nor to deprive employers of liberty or property without due process, nor to be special legislation. Spungin's
Appeal, 32 Pa. D. & C. 611 (1938), opinion by Judge Fox of Dauphin County, 45 Dauph.
C. R.2 145.
Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C.A. §151 et seq.
SAct of May 20, 1926, c. 347, 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151.
4
The N.L.R.A. was upheld in the so-called "Labor Board Cases" all decided by the United
States Supreme Court on April 12, 1937: N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
81 L. Ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615; N.L.R.B. v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U. S. 49, 81 L. Ed. 893, 57 S.
Ct. 642; N.L.R.B. v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co.. 301 U.S. 58, 81 L. Ed. 893, 57 S. Ct.
645; Associated Press v. N.L.R.B., 301 U. S. 103, 81 L. Ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 650; Washington, V. &
M. Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B., 301 U. S. 142, 81 L. Ed. 965, 57 S. Ct. 648.
51937 PA. LEG. JOUR., Vol. 21, page 2446 et seq. For complete legislative history of the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act see 1937 Pa. Leg. Jour. Vol. 21.
For a summary of same see
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board Annual Report for 1937, page 3 el seq.
GFirst Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, June 30, 1936; HARRIS, HERBERT,
AMERICAN LABOR, (1939) Yale Univ. Press; ANDREWS. J. B., LABOR LAWS IN ACTION, (1938)
Harper; TAYLOR, A. G., LABOR PROBLEMS AND LABOR LAW, (1938) Prentice Hall; Stark, Louis,
The N. L. R. B.-Why and How, SOCIAL ACrION, 5 Aug. 1938; Stein, R. M., The N. L. R., B. in
U. S. A. (1938) 48 ECON. JouR. 685; Murphy, Frank, The Shaping of a Labor Policy (1,937) 26
SURVEY GRAPHIC 411; Koenig, L.W., The N. L. R. A.-An Appraisal (1938) 23 CORNELL L.
QUAR. 392; Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Annual Report for 1937, page 2 et seq.; "Labor
Board Cases," supra, note 4; Frey, Alexander Hamilton, The National Labor Relations Act Should
Not be Amended at the Present Session of Congress (1939) 33 ILL. L. REV. 658, at 659; "Wagner
Challenges Critics of His Act," N. Y. Times, July 25, 1937, §8, at 1; "Statement of President Roosevelt on signing the Wagner Act," First Ann. Rep. N. L. R. B. (1936) 9, n. 1; Ross, Malcolm, The
Purpose and Scope of the Labor Act (1935) 2 Prrr..L. REV. 39.
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When the Pennsylvania Legislature of 1937 enacted the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Act it set forth its labor philosophy and policy in Section 2 of the Act.'
The principal purposes of the Pennsylvania Act are: to encourage collective
bargaining between management and labor; to protect the employes' right to
organize; to permit employes freedom of choice in the selection of their bargaining
representatives; and to prevent certain enumerated unfair labor practices.
Two general types of cases are provided for by the Pennsylvania Act.
First, unfair labor practices; and, secondly, selection of bargaining representatives.
II.

UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICES

In 1939, the Pennsylvania Legislature by amendment changed the original
Act in many vital and important aspects. The amendatory Act of June 9, 1939,
8
No. 162, made these changes, which are briefly summarized in the title thereof,
and which will be set forth with particularity later in this article.
7

Act of June 1, 1937, P. L. 1168, Section 2, 43 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 211.2, provides as follows: "Section 2. Findings and Policy.-(a) Under prevailing economic conditions, individual employes do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract. Employers in many
instances, organized in corporate or other forms of ownership association with the aid of government
authority, have superior economic power in bargaining with employes. This growing inequality of
bargaining power substantially and adversely affects the general welfare o( the State by creating
variations and instability in competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between
industries, and by depressing the purchasing power of wage earners, thus-(1) creating sweat-shops
with their attendant dangers to the health, peace, and morals of the people; (2) increasing the disparity between production and consumption; and (3) tending to produce and aggravate recurrent
business depressions. The denial by some employers of the right' of employes to organize and the
refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining tend to lead to strikes, lock.
outs, and other forms of industrial strife and unrest, which are inimical to the public safety and
welfare, and frequently endanger the public health.
(b)
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employes to organize and bargain
collectively removes certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, encourages practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours or other working conditions, and tends to restore equality of bargaining power between employers and employes.
In the interpretation and application of this act and otherwise, it is hereby declared to be the
(c)
public policy of the State to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and to
protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection, free from the interference, restraint or
coercion of their employers.
All the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of this
(d)
purpose.
fe) This act shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the protection of the public welfare, prosperity, health, and peace of the people of the
Commonwealth."
BAct of June 9, 1939, No. 162, entitled:
"AN ACT
To amend the act, approved the first day of June, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven

(Pamphlet Laws, one thousand one hundred sixty-eight), entitled 'An act to protect the right of
employes to organize and bargain collectively; creating the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board;
conferring powers and imposing duties upon the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, officers of
the State government, and courts; providing for the right of employes to organize and bargain
collectively; declaring certain labor practices by employers to be unfair; further providing that
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Section Six of the 1937 Act defined the term "unfair labor practices."
Under that Section only an employer could be guilty of committing an unfair
labor practice and five separate unfair labor practices were set forth. The 1939
Act added a new unfair labor practice on the part of the employer, to-wit: The
checking-off of wages unless authorized by a majority of the Lmployes in the
appropriate collective bargaining unit by secret ballot and unless the employer
thereafter receives the written authorization from each employe affected.
"Unfair labor practices" on the part of the employer are now defined by
the Act of June 1, 1937, P. L. 1168, as amended by the Act of June 9, 1939,
No. 162, Section Six, as follows (it should be noted that the 1939 amendments
are italicized)
"Section 6. Unfair Labor Practices.-( 1) It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employerTo interfere with, restrain or coerce employes in the
(a)
exercise of the rights guaranteed in this act.
(b) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
material support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the board pursuant to this act, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employes to confer
with him during working hours without loss of time or pay.
(c) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That
nothing in this act, or in any agreement approved or prescribed
thereunder or in any other statute of this Commonwealth, shall
representatives of a majority of the employes be the exclusive representatives of all the employes;
authorizing the board to conduct hearings and clections, and certify as to representatives of erpployes
for purposes of collective bargaining; empowering the board to prevent any person from engaging
in any unfair labor practice, and providing a procedure for such cases, including the issuance of a
complaint, -the conducting of a hearing, and the making of an order; empowering the board to
petition a court of common pleas for the enforcement of its order, and providing a procedure for
such cases; providing for the review of an order of the board by a court of common pleas on petition
of any person aggrieved by such order, and establishing a procedure for such cases; providing for
an appeal from the common pleas court to the Supreme Court; providing the board with investigatory powers, including the power to issue subpoenas and the compelling of obedience to them
through application to the proper court; providing for service of papers and process of the board;
prescribing certain penalties,' broadening the definition of 'labor dispute'; further defining the rights
of employes; further, defining, declaring and limiting certain unfair labor practices by employers

and employes; making further provision for designation and selection of representatives for the
purpose of collective bargaining; changing the practice before the Pennsylvania Labor Relations

Board and limiting its powers in certain cases, and requiring investigations of labor disputes and
issuance of subpoenas on the application of either party to a controversy; prescribing further qualifications for the reducing the salaries of members of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board; making
rules and regulations of the board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Labor and Industry;
and prescribing certain forfeitures of rights."
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preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labof
organizaion (not established, maintained or assisted by any action
defined in this act as an unfair labor practice) to require, as a
condition of employment, membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employes, as provided in
section seven (a) of this act, in the appropriate collective bargaining
unit covered by such agreement when made and if such labor organization does not deny membership in its organization to a person or
persons who are employes of the employer at the time of te making
of such agreement, provided such employe was not employed in
violation of any previously existing agreement with said labor organization.
(d) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employe b'ecause he has filed charges or given testimony under this act.
(e)
To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employes, subject to the provisions of section sevn (a) of
this act.
(f) To deduct, collect, or assist incollecting from ihe wages
of employes any dues, fees, assessments, or other contributions payable to any labor organization, unless he is authorized so to do by a
majority vote of all the employes in the appropriate collective
bargaining unit taken by secret ballot, and unless he thereafter receives the written authorization from each employe whose wages
are affected."
Section 6 (f) clearly outlaws the check-off in intra-state industries, unless
two conditions are complied with. First, a majority of all the employes in the
proper bargaining unit by secret ballot must authorize the employer to deduct or
collect dues, fees, assessments or other contributions payable to labor organizations, out of their wages; and second, each employe whose wage is affected must
authorize his employer so to do in writing. An interesting question arises as
to the legality of the coal mine union contracts with the so-called "captive" mines
providing for the check-off. The "captive mines" are those owned by a manufacturer and only mine coal for the manufacturer. In many such cases the coal
is'mined and consumed wholly in Pennsylvania. It would seem that this new
provision might vitiate the check-off provisions of such contracts.
Due to practical experience and social, political and economic reasons, substantial arguments have been advanced on many fronts for the amendment of the
National Labor Relations Act and the corresponding state acts. Just as strongly,
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advocates of the Acts have resisted any proposed changes. 9
In line with the demand for changes in the labor relations laws, Pennsylvania
passed its 1939 amendatory Act. One of the chief complaints of the old
law was that only the employer could be guilty of unfair labor practices. Many
thought it unreasonable that an employer be curbed while labor organizations or
their representatives were free to do acts prohibited to the employer.
At any rate, the amendatory Act of 1939 added an entirely new subsection
to Section 6, defining certain actions by labor organizations to be unfair labor
practices. This new subsection reads:
"(2)
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization, or any officer or officers of a labor organization, or any agent
or agents of a labor organization, or any one acting in the interest
of a labor organization, or for an employe or for employes acting
in concert(a" To intimidate, restrain, or coerce any employe by threats
of force or violence or harm to the person of said employe or the
members of his family or his property, for the purpose and with theintent of compelling such employe to join or to refrain from joining
any labor organization, or for the purpose or with the intent of influencing or affecting his selection of representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining.
(b) During a labor dispute, to join or become a part of a
sit-down strike, or, without the employer's authorization, to seize or
hold or to damage or destroy the plant, equipment, machinery, or
other property of the employer, with the intent of compelling the
employer to accede to demands, conditions, and terms of employment including the demand for collective bargaining.
(c)
To intimidate, restrain, or coerce any employer by threats
of force or violence or harm to the person of said employer or the
9
Burke, Edward R., IWhy the National Labor Relations Act Should be Amended (1939) 33
ILL. L. REV. 648; Cassels, Edwin H., Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (1939) 20
CHICAGO BAR REC. 167-170, 198-200; Gellhorn, Walter, and Linfield, Seymour, Politics and Labor
Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of N. L. R. B. Procedure (1939) 39 COLUMBIA L. REv. 339;
Frey, A. H., The National Labor Relationr Act Should Not be Amended a; the Present Session of
Congress (1939) 33 ILL. L. REV. 658; Hanning, M. F., Weakness of the Wagner Labor Act and
Suggested Amendment (1939) 10 CLEVELAND BAR Assoc. JOUR. 73; Call, John C., and Smethurst,
Raymond S., Amending the Wagner Act, the Problem from the Manuacturer's Viewpoint (1938) 5
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 306; Madden, J. Warren, Administrative Procedure: National Labor Relations Board (1939) 45 W. VA. L. QUAR. 93; "Wagner Challenges Critics of His Act," N. Y.
Times, July 25, 1937, §8, at 1; Heathbarry, R., and Cowely, Charles P., The National Labor Relations Act (1936) 3 PITT. L. REV.. 33. See also dissenting opinions of N. L. R. B. Board Mem-

ber, Dr. William M. Leiserson, in very recent N. L. R. B. decisions, particularly N. L. R. B. v.

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., September, 1939.
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members of his family, with the intent of compelling the employer
to accede to demands, conditions, and terms of employment including the demand for collective bargaining."
Other states that have extended their unfair labor practice provisions of their
labor relations laws to certain acts of labor organizations or their representatives
are the following: Massachusetts,' 0 Michigan," Minnesota,1 2 and WisconContrary to general popular impression, but few states have labor relations
sin.'
laws such as we are familiar with. In addition to Pennsylvania and the four
states mentioned in the first sentence of this paragraph, the following have labor
relations laws such as the Wagner Act: New York, 14 and Utah, '1 while Virginia
has a labor relations commission.' 6 The great majority of states have no laws
comparable to the Wagner Act, and the majority of those which do have broadened
the scope of their laws to make labor organizations subject to unfair labor practice
prohibitions, in somewhat the same manner as Pennsylvania has done.

III.

SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

We have seen that the Pennsylvania Act deals generally with two broad
situations. The first, the prohibition of certain unfair labor practices, has been
discussed. The second concerns the selection of representatives for collective
bargaining on behalf of the employes. Section 7 of the Act, as amended, deals
with this matter. Prior to 1939, no employer had the statutory right to petition
the State Labor Relations Board for an election. This condition was the same as
then confronted the interstate employer under the Wagner Act. By regulation
the National Labor Board has empowered the employer to request an election in
certain cases. 17 In Pennsylvania. however, the change has been statutory by means
of the Act of 1939.
The entire Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, as amended
in 1939, now reads as follows (it should be noted that the 1939 amendments
are italicized):
"Section 7. Representatives and Elections.-a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
101MASSACHUSETTS STATE LABOR RELATIONS LAW, Chapter 345, Acts 1938, approved May
19, 1938, as amended by Chapter 318, Act 1939, approved June 26, 1939, Section 4A.
i1MICHIGAN LABOR RELATIONS LAW, Public Act No. 176, Laws 1939, approved and effective

June 8, 1939, Section 17.
12MINNESOTA LABOR RELATIONS ACT, Chapter 440, Laws of 1939, approved April 22, 1939,
immediately, Section 11.
effective
13 WISCONSIN EMPLOYMENT PEACE ACT, Chapter iii of Wisconsin Statutes, as enacted by
Chapter 57, Laws of 1939, approved May 3, 1939, effective May 4, 1939, Section 11"1.06 (2).
14NEw YORK STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACT, Chapter 443, Laws 1937 (Ch. 32, Secs. 700-716.
Supp.1 5 1937), approved May 20, 1937.
UTAH LABOR RELATIONS ACT, Chapter 55, Laws 1937, approved and effective March 23, 1937.
16Va. Sessions Laws of 1938, S.J.R, 1, L. 1938.
71N. L. R. B. General Rules and Regulations--Series 2, effective July 14, 1939.
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by the majority of the _mployes in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employes in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employe or a group of employes
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
(b)
The board shall decide in each case whether, in order to
insure to employes the full benefit of their right to self-organization
and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies
of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That if the majority of a craft union
'within a plant, or employer unit, signify its wish for a craft unit, the
board shall designate the craft unit as the unit appropriatefor the
members of that union.
(c) Whenever a question arises concerning the representation
of employes the board may, and, upon request of a labor organizalion, or an employer wbo has not committed an act herein defined
as unfair labor practice, or any group of employes in an appropriate
unit representing by petition thirty per centum or more of the employes of that unit, shall investigate such controversy and certify to
the parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives
who have been designated or selected. In any such investigation,
tht Board shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice,
either in conjunction with a proceeding under section eight, or otherwise, and may [take a secret ballot of employes or] utilize any
[other] suitable method to ascertain such representatives, except that
if either party to the controversy so requests, a secret ballot of employes shall be taken within twenty days after such request is filed.
Any certification of representatives by the board shall be binding for
a period of one year, or for a longer period if the contract so provides,
even though the unit may have changed its labor organization membership.
(d) Whenever an order of the board, made pursuant to
section eight, subsection (c), is based, in whole or in part, upon
facts certified following an investigation pursuant to subsection (c)
of this section, and there is a petition for the enforcement or review
of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation
shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be
filed under subsections (a) or (b) of section nine, and thereupon
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the decree of the court enforcing, modifying or setting aside, in
whole or in part, the order of the board, shall be made and entered
upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such
transcript, an appeal may be taken from any certification although
not a final order, either immediately or within fifteen days of its
issuance or after some final order has been entered as provided in
section nine of this act, but an appeal from an order which is not
final shall neither stay nor supersede any proceeding pending before
the board unless so ordered by the court."
Other changes in or additions to Section 7 besides the granting to employers
of the right to request an election are the provisions stating that the State Labor
Relations Board shall designate a craft unit as the appropriate unit where the
majority of a craft union within a plant or employer unit shall signify its wish
for a craft unit; giving a group in an appropriate unit representing by petition at
least thirty per cent of the employes in that unit the right to request an election;
providing for the taking of the secret ballot within twenty days if requested:
making the certification of the board binding for one year or longer if the contract
so provides; and providing for an appeal within fifteen days from any certification
although not a final order. Thus, if a labor organization is certified by the Board
as the sole bargaining agent, it could enter into a contract with the employer for
a period of one year, five years or any number of years under a strict statutory
interpretation of Section 7.
IV.

OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT AS AMENDED

Section 3 (b) of the 1937 Act defined the term person as follows:
"(b) The term 'person' includes an individual, partnership, association, corporation, legal representative, trustee, trustee in bankruptcy or receiver."
This has been amended by the 1939 Act so as to include labor organizations
within the meaning of the term "person," said Section 3 (b) now reading as
follows (amendment in italics):
"Section 3. Definitions. When used in this act-(b) The term
'person' includes an individual, partnership, association, corporation,
legal representative, trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, [or] receiver,
or labor organization."
Thus tht Pennsylvania Act now includes within its provisions and prohibitions not only the employer but also the employes' labor organizations.
Section 4 of the Act provides for the creation of the "Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board" composed of three members appointed by the Governor with
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the advice and consent of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate. The 1939
Act amended this Section by adding the following qualification to the previously
existing prohibition against Board members holding other state or federal offices:
"nor shall he engage in any business or commercial enterprise of any kind, nor
be an officer in any labor organization, or be engaged in any political activities."
The regular term of office is six years. Two m'embers of the Board constitute a
quorum. The salaries of Board members had been $9000 a year under the 1937
Act but in 1939 this was reduced to $7500 for the Chairman and $7000 for the
other two members, with the Board members eligible for reappointment. Under
the Act as amended the Board has the authority to make, amend and rescind rules
and regulations governing it by and with the approval of the Secretary of Labor
and Industry.
Section 6 (c) allows an agreement between employer and a labor organization for a closed shop "if such labor organization does not deny membership in
its organization to a person or persons who are employes of the employer at the
time of the making of such agreement, provided such employe was not employed
in violation of any previously existing agreement with said labor organization."
Section 8 of the Act deals with the prevention of unfair labor practices. The
Labor Board is given "exclusive" power to prevent any person from engaging in
unfair labor practices. Upon charges filed by an employe, labor organization or
employer that any person, employer or labor organization is engaging in unfair
labor practices, the Board causes an investigation to be made. Should the Board
feel that a substantial basis exists for the charges filed a complaint is issued
against the offending party.18
A full hearing is then held before a Trial Examiner after due notice and
opportunity to answer. Section 8 (b) in part states that "in any such proceeding,
the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall be followed but
shall not be controlling." (Italics show 1939 amendment). The Board may
then dismiss the complaint or issue a "cease and desist" order against the offender,
in which the Board may also require reasonable affirmative action such as reinstatemL-nt of employes wrongfully discharged with or without back pay; however "no order shall award back pay from a period more than six weeks prior
to the time of the filing of the complaint."' 9 Either the Board itself or the Trial
Examiner in Lach case involving unfair labor practices and representation cases.
too, makes "findings of fact," "conclusions of law," and a nisi "order." Due
process does not call for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an intermediate
report on the part of the Trial Examiner, with the opportunity to file exceptions
18 Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Annual Report for 1937, p. 5; Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Annual Report for 1938, p. 5, mimeographed report.
1
PENNSYLVANIA LABOR RELATIONS AcT of June 1, 1937, P. L. 1168, Section 8(c) as amended by Act of June 6, 1939, No. 162.
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and have oral argument thereon. This has been ruled squarely.20 The Board.
after any hearing by a Trial Examiner, may itself take the case in its hands for
whatever decision it deems proper, provided respondent had a full hearing. 2 '
No findings of fact are to be "made on the basis of evidence relating to acts
which occurred prior to" June 1, 1937.22 Since the Labor Act creates a new
status between employer and employe, provides for unfair labor practices and
selection of employe bargaining agents, and penalizes violations thereof, it could
not be retrospective in scope. The National Act has been held to require interpretation thereof prospectively, unless there can be shown a continuation of acts
after the effective date of such Act or Acts.' 8
20National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U. S. 333, 82 L.
Ed. 1381, 58 S.Ct. 904 (1938).
251bid.
2
2Section 8(e) as amended of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act.
2
31n Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co., v. N. L. R. B., 91 F. (2d) 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937),
Circuit Judge Parker at page 139 carefully noted that:
"The action of the board was not predicated upon anything that occurred prior to the
passage of the act, but upon an unfair labor practice which o&urred ten days after its
effective date, i. e., upon refusal to bargain collectively with the representative of the
employees, which occurred July 15th." (Italics supplied),
The case of Appalachian Electric Power Company vs. National Labor Relations Board, 93 F.
(2d) 985, at page 989 (C.C.A. 4th 1938) was decided January 4, 1938. In setting aside the
N. L. R. B. or.der concerning alleged unfair labor practices, Circuit Judge Parker said in part:
"There is no question but that the reduction in the working force at the Glen Lyn plant
was made bona fide for business reasons. The Board found that petitioner was opposed
to unionization and that the high percentage of union men thrown out of employment as
a consequence of the reduction evidenced discrimination on account of union membership;
but the board properly held that, as this occurred prior to the passage of the act, it could
not be made the basis of complaint against petitioner." (Italics suppli'ed).
In addition to creating new obligations and liabilities, the Pennsylvania State Labor Relations
Act is punitive in nature. As such it comes within the Pennsylvania constitutional provision against
ex post facto laws, which is as follows: PA. CONSTITUTION, Article 1, Section 17-Purdon's Digest,
Pa, Constitution:
"No ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, or making
irrevocable any grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed."
In Sadsbury Township v. Dennis et al., 96 Pa. 400 (1880) at page 402, an Act of Assembly which
attempted to impose upon a County a liability that had no previous existence was considered by the
Court. At page 402, Mr. Justice Green ruled:
"This act creates a liability and gives a remedy. So far as it creates a liability which had
no previous existence, we should regard it as inoperative under decisions heretofore made."
The Pennsylvania UNIFORM STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ACT of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, Art.
IV, Sec, 56, 46 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 556 expressly provides that:
"No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by
the legislature."
See also Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. 266 U. S. 435, 437 (1924) ; Miller
v. U. S., 294 U. S. 435, 439 (1934); Brewster v. Gage, 280 U. S. 327, 337 (1929); Shwab V.
Doyle, Collector, 258 U. S. 529, 534, 535 (1921); and U. S. v. S. F. & T. Ry., 270 U. S. 1, 3
(1925)'. The Pennsylvania Labor Board itself has recognized this salutary rule in its Report. Pa.
Labor Relations Board, Annual Report for 1937, page 19:
"The Board has declined to accept numerous charges alleging unfair labor practices where
the matters complained of occurred prior to June 1, 1937, the effective date of the act.
If there is q continuing of current labor dispute, however, or other conditions exist which
indicate that the jurisdiction of the Board can be sustained, the charges are accepted for
investigation and appropriate action." (Italics mine).
See also case of Duquesne Light Company and The Independent Association of Employees of
Duquesne Light Company and Associated Companies and U. W, 0. C., Pa. L. R. B. No. 71 year
of 1937, decided August 22, 1939, page 12 et seq.
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A Trial Examiner cannot hold any other position with the State or Federal
Government.
Until a transcript of the record has been filed with a court, the Board may,
upon proper notice, modify or set aside in whole or in part any finding or order
made or issued by it.
Section 9 of the Act deals with judicial review. Under it the Labor Board
itself cannot enforce its orders. It must petition the court of common pleas in
the county where the matter took place for enforcement of its order and for
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, after filing with such court a
complete transcript of the case. No objection not urged before the Board will
be considered by the common pleas court unless excused by extraordinary circumstances. "The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive." The court may send the case back to the Board for further
testimony and proceedings thereon. The common pleas court has exclusive
jurisdiction except that its final judgment or decree is subject to review by the
Supreme Court on appeal by either party, irrespective of the nature of the decree
or judgment or the amount involved. Such appeal shall be taken in the same
manner and form as other appeals to the Supreme Court.
Any person, labor organization, employer, or employe aggrieved by a final
order of the Board may obtain a review of such order in the common pleas court
in the county where the matter involved took place, upon filing therewith a
petition for review and a transcript of the entire record. The proceedings before
the common pleas court and appeal therefrom are the same as in the cases where
the Board itself seeks enforcement of its order. In all cases of review to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania appellant may print testimony in narrative form
and abridged.
The 1939 Act specifically states that the Labor Anti-Injunction Act of June
2, 1937, P. L. 1198, shall not apply to orders of the Board or court orders
enforcing or restraining same.
No petitions or charges involving alleged company domination of unions
relieve the Board from deciding petitions for selection of collective bargaining
representatives.
Occasionally some-of the older unions prefer charges of unfair labor practices against the employer, alleging that an independent or other union is company
fostered or dominated. Prior to th% 1939 amendment of Section 9. if such
charges were pending, there was no statutory authority for the Board to allow a
petition of such independent or other union against which charges were filed for
an election to determine the majority choice of the employes. Now, this is
remedied, and even though unfair labor practice charges involving a union are
pending, if that union requests an election the Board must order such election
by secret ballot within twenty days after such request is filed. This amendment,
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then, facilitates the exercise of the employes' free choice of representatives for
collective bargaining.
Section 9. as amended, further sets forth the following sp'ecific limitation:
"No petition or charge shall be entertained which relates to acts which occurred
or statements which were made more than six weeks prior to the filing of the
petition or charge."
Section 10 gives the Board broad investigatory powers, and was amended in
1939 to make the granting of subpoenas upon the request of tither party a matter
of right at any stage of a pending proceeding. An interesting question arises
as to whether or not a union's records, papers, accounts, and books are subject
to such subpoena. They probably are, although the older unions have strenuously
objected to the validity of such subpoenas.
An entire new section known as Section 10.1 was added to the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Act by the 1939 Act, which reads as follows:
"Section 10.1. Forfeiture of Rights--Whenever the board shall
find, as part of its findings of fact in any proceedings before it, that
tht party or parties filing charges of unfair labor practices upon
which the complaint was based have engaged in an unfair labor
practice [as defined in section six] in connection with or as part
of the actions forming the basis of the complaint, such findings shall
constitute a complete defense to the complaint, and no order shall
issue thereon against the person charged."
In effect, this new section tells complainants that they must come before
the Labor Board with clean hands, otherwise all rights thereunder are forfeited.
This section will undoubtedly be used often by respondents, Its efficacy will be
determined ultimately by the courts.
On July 14, 1937, the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board promulgated
extensive "Rules and Regulations" issued in printed form. These are comprehensive and set forth in detail the procedure to be followed in cases before the
Board. Intervention by interested parties in Board proceedings is fully provided for.
For able and complete summaries of the work of the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board, its 1937 and 1938 Annual Reports stand out. Moreover,
a thorough examination of these Reports, particularly that of 1938, will reveal
the Board's position and policy on many of the complex labor relations questions
constantly arising. No study of the Labor Relations Law in Pennsylvania is
complete without reference to these two Reports.
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CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND STATE BOARDS

An important question arises over the extent of the jurisdiction of the
National and Pennsylvania Boards. In an authoritative opinion on this subject,
Mr. Justice Finch of the New York Court of Appeals in Matter of Davega City
Radio, Inc. v. N. Y. S. L. B. 24 held:
"Appellant, to establish the proposition that when Congress
has acted in a field within its competence State legislation is necessarily superseded, relies on Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.
(272 U. S.605); Oregon Washington R. R. & Nay. Co. v. Washington (270 U. S. 87); Erie R. R. Co. v. New York (233 U. S.
671); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Washington (222 U. S. 370);
and Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid (222 U. S. 424).
To the foregoing cases may be added the Second Employers'
Liability Cases (223 U. S. 1, 55), where the court declared, 'And
now that Congress has acted, the laws of the states, insofar as they
cover the same field, are superseded, for necessarily that which is
not supreme must yield to that which is.' But in all the cases in
which such or similar language is to be found it is clear that the
problem is one of State regulations whose requirements differ from
those of the Acts of Congress.
Appellant argues that it is the intent of Congress, as expressed
in the National Labor Relations Act, to preclude consistent State
regulation of the same subject-matter and that this intent is purportedly established by the absence of a saving clause in the National
act and by the fact that the National Labor Relations Board is given
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the terms of that act. The significance of the lack of a saving clause in favor of State legislation is
considerably diminished by the fact that there was no like legislation
in existence when Congress adopted the National act. Furthermore,
where the result would be to curtail what is otherwise an exercise
of the State's police power, such an intent is not to be inferred, but
must be clearly manifested. (Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1;
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137;)
That the National Labor Relations Board is given exclusive
jurisdiction under the National act is of significance only in fixing
the appropriate agency to enforce the National act, and is not
24

dent.

Matter of Davega City Radio, Inc., Appellant, against State Lal~or Relations Board, Respon(Decided July 11, 1939). New York Court of Appeals.
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relevant to the question whether a consistent State law may co-exist
with a National act.
We reach the conclusion, therefore, that the State Labor Relations Board may enforce the State Act at least until such time as
it is ousted by the exercise of the National Labor Relations Board
of its jurisdiction under the National act. At what point the State
Board would be displaced need not be considered. (Cf. Lake Erie,
etc., R. R. v. Public Utility Commission, 109 Ohio St. 103.) It is
sufficient that in the present case the National Board has not acted.
Indeed, the record shows that the appellant was informed by the
Regional Director of the National Board, albeit not by formal order,
that the Board would not assume jurisdiction.
Appellant seeks to create a twilight zone in which it may disobey its plain duty, required by both statutes, upon the pretext that
its conduct is dictated by the other statute. Insofar as is possible
within the framework of our Federal form of government, such a
result should be avoided. To permit State enforcement of a State
law consistent with a Federal law on the same subject until such time
as the appropriate Federal Agency asserts its own jurisdiction in no
way lessens the supremacy of the National laws as required by
Article VI of the Constitution.
The same question was considered in Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Rueping Co. (228 Wis. 473), and the same decision
was there rendered."
Pennsylvania Attorney General Margiotti on October 13, 1937,25 ruled in
an opinion that the jurisdiction of the National and Pennsylvania Boards was
not concurrent but that each had exclusive jurisdiction in its respective field. The
test he provided was whether or not interstate commerce was affected. If it
were, then the National Board had jurisdiction. Since nearly everything done in
the field of commerce affects interstate commerce, this view would appear to be
too rigid and impractical. The New York and Wisconsin cases in this regard
seem to be better law.
STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD NOT

To

BE CONFUSED WITH

LABOR MEDIATION BOARD

An error to be avoided is the confusing of the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Act with the Pennsylvania Labor Mediation Act of May 18, 1937. 26 The Labor
25
Opinion,
26

Atty. Geni. Margiotti, 30 Pa. D. & C. 280; 85 Pgh. L. J. 716, (1937).

Act of May 18, 1937, P. L. 674, 43 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)

§ 211.31.
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Relations Act does not authorize that Board to appoint individuals for the purpose
of conciliation, mediation or arbitration." In the same manner the Mediation
Act does not apply to any controversy involving unfair labor practices or the
28
selection of collective bargaining agents.
The Labor Board has quasi-judicial functions in hearing and determining
labor controversies within its jurisdiction as well as its investigatorial powers.
The Labor Board cannot act as mediator or conciliator in labor disputes. It is
important to note that the function of mediation rests with the Department of
Labor and Industry. Neither body exercises concurrent jurisdiction, but exercise
separate and distinct functions.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion it may be stated fairly that the 1939 Legislature attempted to
make the statutory requirements for labor relations in Pennsylvania more equitable
both as concerns the employer and the employe. Whether or not this result has
been achieved depends not only upon the administration of the Act, but also
upon the decisions of the courts interpreting the Act as amended.
PITTSBURGH.. PA.
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NICHOLAS UNKOVIC

Act of June 1, 1937, P. L. 1168, Section 4 (e), 43 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 211.4; Act of May
is, 1937,
P. L. 674, Section 9, 43 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 211.39.
2
$Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Annual Report for 1937, p. 6, and 1938 Annual Re.
port (mimeographed), p. 3. These admirable reports are invaluable in the study of the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Law and its workings.

